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Abstract
This study compares the relation between backwardation and optimal
hedging demand as suggested by economic theory to empirical ¯ndings
concerning the impact of weak and strong backwardation on hedgers'
trading volume in six long and short currency futures contracts. First,
the optimal hedging demand of a representative importer, with and
without hedging costs, is derived. Then hedgers' position data from
the Commitments of Traders (COT) report are regressed on weak and
strong backwardation. The empirical results o®er little support for the
hypotheses suggested by economic theory.
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JEL Classi¯cation: C20, D81, G15.
¤I would like to thank Ingo Barens for many helpful comments and suggestions.1 Introduction
Most recent models on optimal hedging deal with exporting ¯rms facing price or
exchange rate risk. In order to hedge the spot commitment, ¯rms go short in
futures contracts.1 This hedging literature, dealing with exporting ¯rms hedging
short, unequivocally suggests a negative relation between backwardation and the
size of the optimal short hedging position.2 In sum, the literature suggests that
if the futures market is characterized by backwardation [contango] it is optimal for
the short hedger to underhedge [overhedge] where underhedging [overhedging] means
choosing a futures position smaller [larger] than the initial spot commitment. In the
absence of backwardation or contango, the ¯rm hedges fully, and therefore chooses
the futures position to be the same size as the spot position.3 Hence, an increase in
backwardation should ceteris paribus reduce the trading volume of hedgers in short
futures contracts.
This paper studies the impact of backwardation on hedging activity in short and long
currency futures contracts. First, the optimal hedging strategy of a representative
importer is derived. The importing ¯rm expects delivery of a certain amount of
a good at a futures date at the then prevailing random exchange rate. To hedge
the spot exposure the importer can go long in currency futures markets. Second,
1See e.g. Briys, Crouhy and Schlesinger (1993), Briys and de Varenne (1998), Briys and
Schlesinger (1993), Friberg (1998), Adam-MÄ uller (1997, 2000) and Lien and Wang (2002). For
more information on the role of unbiasedness in futures markets and hedging see e.g. Benninga,
Eldor and Zilcha (1984, 1985), Broll and Eckwert (1996, 2000), Broll, Wahl and Zilcha (1995) and
Zilcha and Broll (1992).
2In the literature, the term backwardation is used in a variety of ways relating current and
expected spot prices to futures and forward prices. Following Holthausen (1979), Briys and
Schlesinger (1993) and Adam-MÄ uller (2000), in this study, backwardation is de¯ned as the fu-
tures price being less than the expected spot price. The futures market is said to exhibit contango
if the futures price exceeds the expected spot price. The literature on backwardation and contango
dates back to Keynes (1930), Hicks (1939) and Kaldor (1940). There is a large literature dealing
with the controversy about the Keynesian \normal backwardation" hypothesis. Some studies ¯nd
backwardation to be normal while others reject the hypothesis. For a survey on the controversy, see
e.g. Ehrhardt, Jordan and Walkling (1987), Kolb (1992) and Mi®re (2000). This paper does not
add to this controversy but rather investigates the impact of backwardation on hedgers' demand
for currency futures contracts.
3See e.g. Briys, Crouhy and Schlesinger (1990, 1993), Briys and de Varenne (1998), and Broll
and Wong (2002).
1hedging costs are introduced into the model. Third, the impact of backwardation
on long and short hedging activity in six currency futures markets is investigated
empirically. To the best of our knowledge, there is rarely any literature dealing
with importers hedging long. Among the few exceptions are Haigh and Holt (2000)
and Jin and Koo (2006). Haigh and Holt (2000) use a model in which hedgers
are simultaneously long and short in di®erent futures markets. Jin and Koo (2006)
examine the hedging problem of a Japanese grain importer facing multiple risks.
However Haigh and Holt (2000) and Jin and Koo (2006) do not investigate the
role of backwardation and contango on optimal hedging. In addition the model
in this paper is related to the expected utility framework laid out by Holthausen
(1979) and Briys and Schlesinger (1993), whereas Haigh and Holt (2000) and Jin
and Koo (2006) both employ the mean-variance concept. Holthausen (1979) and
Briys and Schlesinger (1993) investigate the impact of backwardation on the optimal
hedging decisions of exporting ¯rms. The model presented in this paper extends
these investigations to importers. In addition, this paper investigates the impact of
hedging costs on the importer's optimal hedging strategy.
The model of the importer's hedging problem introduced in this paper leads to
the conclusion that it is optimal for long hedgers to overhedge [underhedge] if the
futures market is characterized by backwardation [contango]. The ¯rm hedges fully
in the absence of backwardation or contango. However, this result is altered by
introducing hedging costs. In fact, the existence of hedging costs provides a rationale
for backwardation to be normal. In the presence of hedging costs, the importing
¯rm hedges fully if, and only if, the futures market exhibits backwardation. The
¯rm tends to overhedge if the amount of backwardation exceeds hedging costs. The
¯rm hedges fully if the extent of backwardation equals hedging costs. If hedging
costs exceed the amount of backwardation, or, if the futures market is unbiased or
exhibits contango, the optimal hedge is a partial hedge. However, irrespective of
the existence of hedging costs, an increase in backwardation should ceteris paribus
increase the trading volume of hedgers in long futures contracts.
2Although there is a large literature dealing with backwardation and ¯rms' opti-
mal hedging strategies in the theory of the ¯rm, few attempts have been made to
approach the impact of backwardation on hedgers' demand for futures contracts em-
pirically. The empirical part of this study analyzes the impact of backwardation on
hedgers' demand for short and long currency futures contracts in six currency futures
markets. Following Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995) and Pindyck (2001), two
measures for backwardation (i.e., weak and strong backwardation) are employed.
Using simple OLS regression analysis the results of this study show that backwarda-
tion has a signi¯cant impact on hedgers' trading volume in currency futures markets.
However, the sign of the impact does not correspond to economic theory for all cur-
rencies. The results therefore o®er very little support for the hypothesis that short
[long] hedging activity depends negatively [positively] on backwardation.
In Section 2 the model is presented and the ¯rm's optimal hedging strategy is de-
rived. The impact of backwardation and contango on the optimal hedge are analyzed
and hedging costs are introduced into the model. Section 3 presents the empirical
results based on OLS regressions. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Expected Utility Hedging Model
2.1 Optimal Long Hedging
Suppose there is a representative importer in country A who is obliged to buy a
known quantity x of a good from country B at period t = 1 at a certain price level
p.4 Having made the decision to import the quantity x, the ¯rm faces exchange rate
4It is important to stress that the quantity x of imports is given. Since the ¯rm in this model is
not deciding about the optimal production level, and therefore not choosing the optimal amount of
imports, this model can be interpreted as concerned with the short run. Moreover, the price level
p is ¯xed, also pointing to a short run model. According to Sandmo (1971) this approach may be
considered a weakness but also a strength. The weakness concerns the separation of production
policy and strategies for ¯nancing and investment. A strength of dealing with short run pro¯ts
is that the model stays relatively simple and is not based on too many assumptions. Moreover it
is more realistic and applicable since hedging is generally concerned with single cash °ows, and
hedging vehicles like futures are generally available only for the short run.
3risk between the period the decision is made (i.e., t = 0) and the spot commitment
date t = 1. The expected return of the spot position depends on the random
exchange rate ~ e1 as follows:
E(RS) = ¡~ e1px (1)
Since the price level p is non-stochastic and known at period t = 0, p is set equal
to one for simplicity. In addition to the spot commitment, the importer can trade
long futures contracts in the currency futures market. Let f0 be the futures price
at time t = 0 for delivery of a certain amount of foreign currency in t = 1. In this
model the importer holds the futures position until delivery at period t = 1, that
is, until the spot commitment date. At futures delivery date, the random futures
delivery price is ~ f1. Suppose that, due to arbitrage relations, the random spot price
and the random futures price coincide at spot commitment date (futures delivery
date, respectively). Then, since basis risk is absent, the expected return of the long
futures position ~ f1 ¡ f0 equals ~ e1 ¡ f0 per contract h.5 If the term ~ e1 ¡ f0 is zero
[not zero], the futures market is said to be unbiased [biased]. If the futures price
is less than the expected spot price (i.e., ~ e1 ¡ f0 > 0), the futures market exhibits
backwardation. The futures market exhibits contango if the futures price exceeds
the expected spot price (i.e., ~ e1¡f0 < 0). The expected pro¯t of the hedged portfolio
is the sum of the expected return of the spot position plus the long futures position:
E(¦) = ¡~ e1x + (~ e1 ¡ f0)h (2)
It can be easily seen that the long futures position can be used to o®set (i.e., to
hedge) the existing spot exchange rate exposure. If the importer chooses the amount
5The di®erence between the random variables ~ e1 and ~ f1 in the delivery period is known as the
basis (or, basis risk, respectively). See e.g. Peck (1975) and Lapan and Moschini (1994).
4of futures contracts traded h to equal the spot commitment x, then the expected
pro¯t of the hedged portfolio is non-stochastic. This hedging strategy is widely
known as the \equal and opposite" or \one to one" hedge. However, although
potential losses in the spot position are o®set by the futures position, potential
gains in the spot position due to a decrease in the exchange rate are o®set as well
by losses in the futures position.
The importer's decision problem is to choose a futures position h to maximize ex-
pected utility. The importing ¯rm maximizes its expected utility of pro¯t at date
t = 1 where U is a concave, continuous and di®erentiable utility function de¯ned
over pro¯t ¦.
Max
h
EU[¦] = U[¡~ e1x + (~ e1 ¡ f0)h] (3)
The ¯rm is assumed to be risk averse, so that U0[¦] > 0, U00[¦] < 0.6 Following
Briys and Schlesinger (1993) the ¯rst-order condition is calculated:
±EU[¦]
±h
= EU
0[¡~ e1x + (~ e1 ¡ f0)h](~ e1 ¡ f0) = 0 (4)
Using the representation of pro¯t presented in equation (2) the ¯rst-order condition
can be rewritten as
±EU[¦]
±h
= EU
0[¦](~ e1 ¡ f0) = 0 (5)
The second-order condition for a maximum are assumed to hold given risk aversion.7
6For more information on similar utility functions and risk aversion see e.g. Pratt (1964), Baron
(1970), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), Sandmo (1971), Diamond and Stiglitz (1974), Ishii (1977),
and Kimball (1990, 1993).
7The second partial derivative of the utility function with respect to h is
5Using the covariance operator Cov, equation (5) can be written as8
dEU[¦]
dh
= EU
0[¦]E(~ e1 ¡ f0) + Cov[U
0[¦]; ~ e1] = 0 (6)
The covariance term Cov[U0[¦]; ~ e1] is crucial in the subsequent analysis of the rela-
tionship between hedging activity and backwardation. Equation (6) can be used to
determine the conditions under which the risk-averse ¯rm hedges fully (i.e., h = x),
hedges partially (i.e., 0 < h < x), or overhedges (i.e., h > x). Note that equation
(6) consists of three terms. U0[¦] is positive for any ¦ by de¯nition. The second
term, E(~ e1 ¡ f0), is zero if the futures market is unbiased (i.e., ~ e1 = f0). Suppose
the second term is zero, then equation (6) reduces to Cov[U0[¦]; ~ e1] = 0.
In order to analyze the covariance term in more detail, recall that pro¯t at date 1
is given by E[¦] = ¡~ e1x + (~ e1 ¡ f0)h. As already mentioned, pro¯t is independent
of the exchange rate if h = x, and hence the covariance is zero. If the ¯rm hedges
less than full (i.e., h < x) the covariance is positive and if the ¯rm overhedges (i.e.,
h > x) the covariance is negative.9
±2EU[¦]
±h2 = EU00[¦](~ e1 ¡ f0)2:
The equation is negative since U0[¦] > 0, U00[¦] < 0 by de¯nition. Therefore an interior maximum
exists. However, as Holthausen (1979, p. 989) points out, this is not the case for risk-neutral
(U00[¦] = 0) or risk-loving ¯rms (U00[¦] > 0).
8To see this, recall that E(XY ) = E(X)E(Y ) + Cov(X;Y ) (see e.g. Cochrane, 2001, p. 15).
Equation (5) can therefore be rewritten as
EU0[¦](~ e1 ¡ f0) = EU0[¦]E(~ e1 ¡ f0) + Cov[U0[¦];(~ e1 ¡ f0)] = 0
which in turn, using Cov(X + Y;Z) = Cov(X;Z) + Cov(Y;Z), can be formulated as
EU0[¦]E(~ e1 ¡ f0) + Cov[U0[¦]; ~ e1] + Cov[U0[¦];¡f0] = 0
Since f0 is non-stochastic, and using Cov(1;X) = 0, the equation can be simpli¯ed to
EU0[¦]E(~ e1 ¡ f0) + Cov[U0[¦]; ~ e1] = 0
9Note that the covariance is de¯ned as
Cov(X;Y ) = E((X ¡ E(X))(Y ¡ E(Y )))
6Now, if the futures market is unbiased, the term ~ e1 ¡ f0 in equation (6) is zero.
Therefore, the covariance must be zero as well for equation (6) to hold. For the
covariance to be zero, which is achieved if pro¯t is independent of exchange rate
changes, the ¯rm must hedge fully. Hence, ¯rms hedge fully when the futures market
is unbiased. If the futures market exhibits backwardation (i.e., ~ e1 > f0) the second
term in equation (6) is positive. The covariance in equation (6) therefore must be
negative for the condition that the ¯rst-order-condition equals zero to hold. This
implies that h > x. The resulting futures position is an overhedge. Now suppose
that the futures market exhibits contango (i.e. ~ e1 < f0). In this case, the covariance
in equation (6) must be positive, since the ¯rst term in the equation is negative, for
the condition that the ¯rst-order-condition equals zero to hold. This implies that
h < x. The resulting futures position is a partial hedge.
2.2 Hedging Costs and Optimal Hedging
In this section hedging costs are introduced into the model. The expected utility of
pro¯t with hedging costs is
EU[¦] = U[¡~ e1x + (~ e1 ¡ f0 ¡ c)h] (7)
Again, pro¯t is independent of the exchange rate if the ¯rm hedges fully (i.e., h = x).
In this case, spot exposure is completely o®set and therefore perfectly hedged by
the futures position. Maximizing expected utility of pro¯t with respect to h yields
Suppose that X = U0[¦] and Y = ~ e1. If the ¯rm underhedges (i.e., h < x), the futures position
is smaller than the spot position and pro¯t therefore depends negatively on the random exchange
rate. An increase in ~ e1 decreases ¦ and, due to concavity, increases U0[¦]. Hence, (X¡E(X)) > 0.
In addition, an increase in ~ e1 leads to (Y ¡ E(Y )) > 0. The covariance is therefore positive.
However, if the ¯rm overhedges (i.e., h > x), the futures position is larger than the spot position.
Since the futures position yields pro¯ts when ~ e1 increases, pro¯t depends positively on the exchange
rate. Hence, an increase in ~ e1 increases ¦ and decreases U0[¦], again, due to concavity. Therefore
(X ¡ E(X)) < 0. Since, everything else is equal, the covariance is negative.
7dEU[¦]
dh
= EU
0[¡~ e1x + (~ e1 ¡ f0 ¡ c)h](~ e1 ¡ f0 ¡ c) = 0 (8)
Using covariances, the ¯rst-order condition can be rewritten as
dEU[¦]
dh
= EU
0[¦]E(~ e1 ¡ f0 ¡ c) + Cov[U
0[¦]; ~ e1] = 0 (9)
Equation (9) consists of three terms. Again, U0[¦] is positive for any ¦ by de¯ni-
tion. The second term, E(~ e1 ¡ f0 ¡ c) is zero if hedging costs equal the amount of
backwardation (i.e., c = ~ e1 ¡ f0). Suppose, the second term is zero, then equation
(9) reduces to Cov[U0[¦]; ~ e1] = 0, which holds true if ¯rms hedge fully. If c > 0, the
term E(~ e1 ¡ f0 ¡ c) in equation (9) is zero if E(~ e1 ¡ f0) > 0, or more precisely if
E(~ e1 ¡ f0) = c. Hence, ¯rms hedge fully if, and only if, futures markets are biased,
i.e. exhibit backwardation (E(~ e1) > f0). If the amount of backwardation exceeds
trading costs c (i.e., E(~ e1 ¡ f0) > c), the second term in equation (9) is positive.
The covariance in equation (9) therefore must be negative for the condition that
the ¯rst-order-condition equals zero to hold. This implies that h > x. The re-
sulting futures position is an overhedge. In the case of an unbiased futures market
(i.e., E(~ e1) = f0), or if the futures market exhibits contango (i.e., E(~ e1) < f0),
the covariance in equation (9) therefore must be positive for the condition that the
¯rst-order-condition equals zero to hold. This implies that h < x. The resulting
futures position is a partial hedge.
3 Empirical Investigation
In this section the impact of backwardation on short and long hedging activity is
empirically investigated. Regarding short hedging, again, the hedging literature
suggests that in the case of backwardation [contango] it is optimal to underhedge
8[overhedge]. The theoretical model in this study dealing with a representative im-
porter's long hedging problem suggests that it is optimal to overhedge [underhedge]
if the futures market is characterized by backwardation [contango]. Hence, ceteris
paribus, the hedging models predict a negative e®ect of backwardation on short
hedging activity and a positive e®ect on long hedging activity.
3.0.1 Data and Summary Statistics
The empirical investigation uses weekly data on spot and futures prices and hedgers'
positions for six currency futures contracts traded at the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change. Australian Dollar (AUD), Canadian Dollar (CAD), Swiss Francs (CHF),
Euro (EUR), Japanese Yen (JPY), and Mexican Peso (MXP) futures contracts are
investigated. The hedgers' position data come from the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission's (CFTC) Commitments of Traders (COT) report and the price data
come from Datastream.10
Following Litzenberger and Rabinowitz (1995) and Pindyck (2001), two measures
for backwardation are employed. Futures markets exhibit strong backwardation if
futures prices are below spot prices (i.e., ~ et > ~ ft). Weak backwardation is de¯ned as
a situation where discounted futures prices are below spot prices (i.e., ~ et > exp(¡rt¤
(3=12)) ~ ft where rt is the three month LIBOR rate).
10For more information on the COT report, see e.g. Chatrath, Song and Adrangi (2003) and
RÄ othig and Chiarella (2007).
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10The summary statistics are presented in Table 1. With regard to the measure of
weak backwardation, backwardation appears to be normal as proposed by Keynes
(1930). All currency futures markets investigated exhibit weak backwardation at
least 95 percent of the time. The results for strong backwardation are mixed. While
some currency futures prices were on average strongly backwarded (i.e., the AUD
and MXP series over 90 percent of the time) some exhibit backwardation and con-
tango from time to time (i.e., CAD and EUR), and some exhibit contango most of
the time (i.e., CHF and JPY). Interestingly, with regard to the measure of strong
backwardation, in the markets where futures prices exhibit contango hedgers are
on average net long (i.e., the mean of long hedging activity exceeds the mean of
short hedging activity in Table 1). Mi®re (2000) points out that the idea that
backwardation and contango depend on hedgers' net positions is consistent with
the Keynesian hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, futures prices should be
backwarded if hedgers are net short, and futures prices should exhibit contango if
hedgers are net long. The inequality between hedgers' long and short positions re-
quires the existence of speculators to ¯ll the gap and restore equilibrium.11 Since
backwardation and contango can be regarded a risk premium earned by speculators,
backwardation [contango] attracts speculators to go long [short]. However, with
regard to the hedging literature and in line with the model in the previous section,
in addition to speculators, hedgers are motivated to hedge long [short], if futures
prices exhibit backwardation [contango], as well.
3.1 Estimation Results
The impact of backwardation on short and long hedgers' volume of trading is inves-
tigated using OLS regressions. Theory suggests that, with growing backwardation,
hedgers' demand for short futures contracts should be reduced and hedgers' demand
11Samuelson (1957, p. 194) points out that \[...] the total long position (of hedgers and specula-
tors) must be exactly matched, at the equilibrium pattern, by the total short position (of hedgers
and speculators)." See also Danthine (1978), Anderson and Danthine (1983) and Fort and Quirk
(1988) for more information on backwardation and speculation.
11Table 2: Short hedging and backwardation
Panel A: Short hedging and weak backwardation: Shortt = ®t + ¯tBWt + "t
AUD CAD CHF
^ ® ^ ¯ ^ ® ^ ¯ ^ ® ^ ¯
Estimate 8374.65 2681316.81 75524.43 -3590257.59 25298.81 -419001.60
t-stat 2.0375 6.8684 26.0117 -12.9298 17.7391 -2.4039
p-value 0.0426 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0164
EUR JPY MXP
^ ® ^ ¯ ^ ® ^ ¯ ^ ® ^ ¯
Estimate 26469.23 3178129.72 52957.23 -69498562.11 36688.42 -2757165.72
t-stat 4.5113 6.7863 21.9728 -2.3656 20.8088 -6.2845
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0182 0.0000 0.0000
Panel B: Short hedging and strong backwardation: Shortt = ®t + ¯tBSt + "t
AUD CAD CHF
^ ® ^ ¯ ^ ® ^ ¯ ^ ® ^ ¯
Estimate 32177.15 1109025.20 39483.96 -1449165.19 23329.78 513526.53
t-stat 16.7385 2.2473 48.6098 -3.5579 34.2664 2.8874
p-value 0.0000 0.0254 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0040
EUR JPY MXP
^ ® ^ ¯ ^ ® ^ ¯ ^ ® ^ ¯
Estimate 66595.54 3488933.76 57072.55 174404335.43 33480.15 -3097865.11
t-stat 49.6444 9.6920 31.3663 6.4209 24.1169 -6.1738
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
for long futures contracts should increase. The empirical investigation in this study
approaches this suggestion on an aggregate level by regressing hedgers' trading vol-
ume in short and long currency futures contracts on weak and strong backwardation.
Table 2 reports the short hedging regression results for weak (Panel A) and strong
(Panel B) backwardation. The results point to a signi¯cant impact of both weak
and short backwardation on short hedging activity. However, this impact is not
negative for all currency futures markets. Regarding the e®ect of weak backwarda-
tion presented in Panel A of Table 2, the estimates for the AUD and EUR series
are signi¯cantly positive. Moreover, the results for strong backwardation shown in
Panel B of Table 2 point only twice (i.e., for the CAD and MXP series) to a negative
impact of backwardation on short hedging activity. Hence, the estimates do not un-
ambiguously support the ¯ndings of a negative relation between backwardation and
12Table 3: Long hedging and backwardation
Panel A: Long hedging and weak backwardation: Longt = ®t + ¯tBWt + "t
AUD CAD CHF
^ ® ^ ¯ ^ ® ^ ¯ ^ ® ^ ¯
Estimate 9646.06 288580.74 41389.99 -1402231.94 36792.97 -1111593.50
t-stat 4.1825 1.3174 21.8482 -7.7397 21.4854 -5.3112
p-value 0.0000 0.1889 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
EUR JPY MXP
^ ® ^ ¯ ^ ® ^ ¯ ^ ® ^ ¯
Estimate 29186.73 816327.22 77025.10 -207209877.40 18794.19 -247771.17
t-stat 6.6789 2.3403 35.6481 -7.8672 24.9139 -1.3199
p-value 0.0000 0.0197 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1874
Panel B: Long hedging and strong backwardation: Longt = ®t + ¯tBSt + "t
AUD CAD CHF
^ ® ^ ¯ ^ ® ^ ¯ ^ ® ^ ¯
Estimate 15579.59 -992639.44 27547.95 -1745129.81 25325.67 -1297957.30
t-stat 16.0204 -3.9763 57.0800 -7.2110 31.1162 -6.1049
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
EUR JPY MXP
^ ® ^ ¯ ^ ® ^ ¯ ^ ® ^ ¯
Estimate 39097.79 -41323.75 58951.70 -61540778.01 18564.30 -309176.63
t-stat 36.7717 -0.1448 33.9150 -2.3717 31.3038 -1.4423
p-value 0.0000 0.8849 0.0000 0.0179 0.0000 0.1498
trading volume of hedgers in short futures contracts as discussed in the theoretical
hedging literature.
Table 3 presents the regression results for long hedging. Again, there appears to
be a signi¯cant impact of backwardation on long hedgers' trading volume for all
currencies except the MXP series, the AUD series and weak backwardation, and
the EUR series and strong backwardation. However the sign of the impact does not
correspond to the theoretical ¯ndings. The impact of backwardation on long hedging
is negative for all currencies except the AUD series and weak backwardation, and
the EUR series and weak backwardation reported in Panel A of Table 3. Hence, the
regression results o®er very little support for the hypothesis that hedging activity
in long futures contracts depends positively on backwardation.
The graphical representations of the regression results con¯rm this ¯nding. Figures
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Figure 1: Short and long hedging and backwardation: Strong backwardation is
represented by `diamonds' (§) and weak backwardation is represented by `boxes'
(¤).
1 and 2 present scatterplots with regression lines for weak and strong backwarda-
tion and short and long hedging activity. Regarding short hedging activity only the
results for the CAD and MXP series show consistently a negative e®ect of back-
wardation on short hedgers' trading activity. The slopes of the four regression lines
shown in Figures 1c) and 2e) are all negative. The results for the AUD and EUR
series suggest a positive relationship (i.e., the slopes are all positive) and the results
for the CHF and JPY series are mixed. The results for long hedging activity are
even worse. None of the regression results point unambiguously to a positive e®ect
of backwardation on long hedging volume. The regression results for the CAD,
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Figure 2: Short and long hedging and backwardation (continued): Strong back-
wardation is represented by `diamonds' (§) and weak backwardation is represented
by `boxes' (¤).
CHF, JPY , and MXP series presented in Figures 1d), 1f), 2d), 2f) consistently
point to a negative impact. The remaining results for the AUD and EUR series are
mixed.
4 Conclusions
This study investigates the impact of backwardation on long and short hedging ac-
tivity in currency futures markets. First, the optimal long hedging strategy of an
importer exposed to currency risk is derived in an expected utility framework with
15and without hedging costs. The model suggests that it is optimal for the long hedg-
ing importer to overhedge [underhedge] if the futures market exhibits backwardation
[contango]. The importing ¯rm hedges fully if the futures market is unbiased. How-
ever, in the presence of hedging costs, the ¯rm hedges fully if the futures market
is characterized by backwardation. Therefore, hedging costs provide a rationale for
backwardation to exist. Irrespective of whether hedging costs are introduced into
the model, backwardation has a positive impact on the size of the ¯rm's optimal
hedging position.
The empirical part of this paper investigates the relationship between backwardation
and hedgers' demand for six currency futures contracts. Hedgers' short and long
trading activity are regressed on weak and strong backwardation. The summary
statistics suggest that backwardation and contango are indeed normal in currency
futures markets as proposed by Keynes (1930). However, the hypothesis of a neg-
ative [positive] impact of backwardation on short [long] hedging activity cannot be
supported.
The contribution of this study is threefold. First, the hedging problem of the repre-
sentative exporter examined by Holthausen (1979) and Briys and Schlesinger (1993)
is extended to the hedging problem of an importer. Second, hedging costs are found
to provide a rationale for backwardation to be normal. Finally, the impact of back-
wardation on long and short hedgers' trading volume in currency futures markets
is investigated empirically. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ¯rst study to
directly regress hedgers' position data from the Commitments of Traders (COT)
report on two measures for backwardation. However, the results o®er very little
support for the hypotheses suggested by economic theory. Further research aimed
at clarifying the determinants of hedgers' demand for currency futures contracts
may be fruitful.
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